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 This paper examines three different perspectives on the military’s treatment of 
gays during the 1990s.  One perspective comes from disinterested observers in another 
place and time.  For the purpose of alliteration, these observers are termed spacemen.  A 
second perspective comes from the author, who works in the community of scholars, and 
feels the pressing need to tell a story from years past.  The third perspective—and the 
main focus of the paper—comes from Navy officers, or sailors, who participated in three 
surveys that span the history of the military’s current policy on gays.2  But first, let’s take 
a flight of fancy, imagining how we must appear to our neighbors above; and then allow 
the author to indulge himself in telling a tale of political arm-twisting and the study that 
might have been.  
 
Spacemen 
Imagine for a moment that television broadcasts from throughout the earth are 
being monitored and analyzed by scientists on planets in the far-distant heavens.  
Imagine, too, that an alien researcher, perhaps an authority in earthly human culture, has 
decided to study the period that earthlings call “the 1990s.”  This particular researcher 
specializes in the geopolitical region known as the United States of America (or USA) 
because of its vast wealth, military dominance, relatively advanced technology, and 
powerful influence on earth.  In looking at “the 1990s,” the alien researcher discovers 
that, aside from a war in the area called Persian Gulf, human sexual behavior is the most 
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for presentation at the national conference of the American Psychological Association, 
Toronto, Canada, August 2003. Author’s contact information:  Dr. Mark J. Eitelberg, Professor of Public 
Policy, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-
5000. Author’s email: meitelberg@nps.navy.mil.  The views presented here are those of the author and 
should not be attributed to any government agency with which the author is affiliated. 
2 The term “gays” is used throughout the paper as a simplified reference to women and men with a 
homosexual orientation. 
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heavily covered television news story of any dealing with the military.3  This is odd, the 
researcher concludes, for surely this must be a culture that is so free of pressing problems 
and basic human needs that it can afford to concentrate its attention on such a thing.  
Even more strange, the researcher concludes, is the way in which differences of opinion 
have been resolved on the matter of human sexual behavior: the USA leaders have 
established a special rule, not found elsewhere in their society, that people who join the 
military cannot be asked about their sexual preferences as long as they do not tell anyone 
about their sexual preferences; these people may possess a sexual preference for persons 
of the same sex and still be a member of the military, but they must restrain their sexual 
nature and not discuss it with anyone, lest they be removed from the military in times of 
peace; if someone suspects that a member is sexually attracted to persons of the same sex, 
no one is allowed to investigate the possibility of a rule violation without a defined cause, 
which few members of the organization fully comprehend; further, recognizing that a 
number of people in the military have a tendency toward homosexuality or bisexuality, 
even though they have not revealed such tendencies, no one is permitted to bother these 
people because of their suspected preference for persons of the same sex.  
The researcher ponders the name of the military’s rule—“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, 
Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass”—and wonders why it exists.  “Aha! I get it,” the researcher 
shouts telepathically to a junior associate. “It’s a military secret that’s not a secret at all.” 
The researcher reflects for another moment or two, sighs in an alien way, and records the 
following in a scientific journal: “Curious species.” 
 
Scholars 
 In the fall of 1990, three years before the introduction of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 
a colleague and long-time friend called me to ask if I would join him and others on a 
panel for the 1991 national conference of the American Psychological Association (APA) 
in San Francisco. The panel was tentatively titled “Gays and the Military,” and the 
participants would examine the US Defense Department’s policy prohibiting 
homosexuals from serving in the armed forces.   
                                                 
3 As reported by the “Women, Men, and Media Project,” Women in Military Service for America 
Foundation, 7 March 2000. See http://www.all4nationaldefense.org/articles_archives.html 
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 The military’s ban on gays had become a particularly “hot” topic a year before, in 
October 1989, when it was revealed that the Defense Department had tried to suppress 
the work of several psychologists from the Defense Personnel Security Research and 
Education Center (PERSEREC) in Monterey, California. The results of two separate 
studies challenged the main reasons given for excluding gays from the military, and 
officials in the Pentagon were outraged.  Although these officials attempted to discredit 
the PERSEREC reports, eventual disclosure of the findings kicked open a door that had 
long concealed the military’s policy from public scrutiny.4    
Up to the point of the proposed panel at APA, no one associated with the 
Department of Defense said much of anything about the reports other than that they were 
“unauthorized,” “flawed and useless,” “not of value,” “a feeble, unreadable waste of 
taxpayer’s money,” representing “only the personal opinion of the authors,” and 
containing nothing “new or useful . . . that has not been considered over time in the 
formulation of the present DoD policy that homosexuality is incompatible with military 
service.”5  It soon became quite apparent that no one from the Pentagon would even 
discuss the military’s ban on gays in public, as Defense Department officials repeatedly 
refused invitations to appear on television talk shows, news broadcasts, and in other 
venues.  The Secretary of Defense eventually acknowledged that prohibiting gays from 
obtaining a security clearance was an “old chestnut”—but he quite carefully stipulated 
that his remarks pertained to gays working in a civilian capacity.  In a sense, then, the 
proposed APA panel would break the Defense Department’s informal code of silence. 
My role on the APA panel would be to compare the policy on gays with the 
military’s previous exclusionary policies, particularly those regarding the service of 
African Americans and women.  I had written several works on “population 
representation” in the military and also coauthored a book on blacks and the military, so 
it was assumed that I could contribute a comparative or historical perspective.  I agreed to 
join the panel and write a paper, without really considering any potential consequences; 
                                                 
4 The most controversial of the reports was Theodore R. Sarbin and Kenneth E. Karols, Nonconforming 
Sexual Orientations and Military Suitability (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research and 
Education Center, 1988). Often overlooked is a second, later work: Michael McDaniel, Pre-service 
Adjustment of Homosexual and Heterosexual Military Accessions: Implications for Security Clearance 
Suitability (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center, 1989).  
5 These comments were actually directed at the report by Sarbin and Karols. See Randy Shilts, Conduct 
Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the US Military (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 649, 681. 
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after all, this would be a simple, relatively isolated, harmless discussion of a policy issue 
by a group of scholars at a professional meeting. 
My memory is a little hazy on the precise details and timing of what happened 
next, but the final outcome was the voluntary withdrawal from the panel by all persons 
directly affiliated with the Department of Defense. I do remember that I was working late 
one day in my office at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), when I received a phone 
call from one of the school’s deans.  APA had recently published its schedule for the 
upcoming conference, and the dean said he wanted to talk with me about my participation 
in the panel on gays in the military.  Apparently, APA’s conference agenda had been 
brought to the attention of an assistant secretary of the Navy who was quite “disturbed” 
upon seeing that a Navy employee was slated to appear in a public discussion of the 
military’s policy toward gays.  As it goes, the assistant secretary called the NPS 
superintendent to express concern; the superintendent called the dean; the dean called me.  
The dean assured me that I had every right to be on the panel, every right to academic 
freedom, regardless of my position as a Navy employee.  The dean expressed his 
confidence in my ability to “not say anything that would embarrass the Navy” (words I 
had often heard before from various public affairs offices).  He surmised that the assistant 
secretary was uneasy about the location of the APA meeting, in an area with a large gay 
community, speculating that the press would attend in large numbers or that gay activists 
would disrupt the panel.   
In the back of my mind, I couldn’t help but think that the situation was somehow 
affected by the tenor of times, when the armed forces were being “downsized” and many 
military installations were being scrutinized for possible realignment or closure. In the 
back of my mind, too, I must have considered the fact that my position with the school 
was still temporary.  I told the dean that I fully intended to honor my commitment to 
participate, and that he should trust my judgment.  I was never asked to remove myself 
from the panel, and it was never even suggested that I do so.  At this point, however, I 
began to understand that my presence on the panel would be watched with great interest 
and that it would not necessarily be free of consequences for me or for others. 
One week later, I was visiting the Pentagon office of my colleague, the person 
who had invited me to participate in the panel.  I was telling him about the phone call 
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from the NPS dean, and expressing my great surprise to learn that an assistant secretary 
of the Navy, a top official in the Navy Department, had taken a personal interest in our 
otherwise inconspicuous panel at APA. How would anyone even know about the panel, 
outside of our usual circle of scholars and psycho-geeks within APA?  Just as I concluded 
my impassioned soliloquy, almost on cue, my colleague’s telephone rings.  He answers 
the phone and immediately strikes a stony pose, staring down, never glancing my way. 
“Yes, I understand,” he says. “Yes. Yes. Yes. No, I understand. Okay.”  From the 
expression on my colleague’s face, I could sense that he’d been hit with a mix of 
disappointment, frustration, and anger. With pursed lips, almost painfully, he forced out 
the words: “That was the assistant secretary of defense. I’ve been instructed to remove 
myself from the APA panel.”  
The great irony in this, as it turned out, is that the panel itself might have gone 
virtually unnoticed—except for the watchful eyes of certain high-ranking Defense 
officials—if it had only proceeded as originally planned.  Instead, an account of the panel 
appeared prominently in the New York Times and in other major news outlets, and the 
lead was the Defense Department’s “gagging” of its employees. One would think that the 
Defense Department’s actions over the PERSEREC reports, less than two years before, 
would have demonstrated that attempts to prevent open discussion and debate of 
controversial policy can easily backfire.  Would many people have taken interest in the 
findings of few wacky psychologists from Monterey, California, if the Pentagon hadn’t 
tried to bury the PERSEREC reports?  Similarly, would the APA panel on gays in 1991 
be “all the news that’s fit to print” if the Pentagon hadn’t intervened? 
 
The Story Continues 
I never did get to write about the connections between the military’s treatment of 
gays and its exclusionary policies for other groups.6  My research moved in other 
directions, and I regret that I did not contribute more to the debate that eventually resulted 
in the current policy.   
                                                 
6 Fortunately, I was able to find an excellent replacement.  Judith H. Stiehm, a highly accomplished scholar 
and author, took my seat on the infamous panel.  In the end, the panel benefited in substituting Judith for 
me, since she had conducted far more research than I on women in the military and had recently authored 
an article on the military’s treatment of gays for a respected law journal. 
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If I had taken the time to write the paper, I would have made heavy use of 
historical language and arguments from published and unpublished sources—tracking 
similarities in how the justifications for exclusion are structured and expressed.  I would 
have challenged the reader, maybe in a mock test, to distinguish between the concepts, 
evidence, and actual words used to argue against racial integration, gender integration, or 
the service of homosexuals. I would have explored the facts and fallacies. And I would 
have suggested, as others have done, that the military’s mystique and long-treasured role 
as the majority’s male rite-of-passage have operated to exclude blacks, women, and gays, 
who were all deemed inferior in one way or another.  Actually, how can one successfully 
complete the rite-of-passage—demonstrating courage, patriotism, citizenship, and 
masculinity—when the organization permits full membership by those who are mentally 
feeble, physically weak, or morally corrupt?  How can one express his true manhood in 
the military alongside people who are generally inferior, men who behave like women, or 
women themselves? 
If I had written the paper, I would have included a section that discusses how 
convenience and military necessity have often intervened in the way the military treats 
otherwise excluded groups. In 1982, Binkin and Eitelberg wrote “the black experience in 
the American armed forces has likewise been marked by policies of exclusion during 
periods of peace and expedient acceptance during mobilization for war.”7  Likewise, one 
can trace periods in recent history when the military just “looked the other way” 
regarding homosexuality, for the benefit of a military operation.  In fact, the armed 
services have even prohibited the discharge of homosexuals, to prevent personnel 
turnover or organizational disruption during critical military operations. 
One of the most obvious differences between the military’s treatment of blacks, 
women, and gays relates to the organization’s place within the larger society.  The US 
armed forces are widely recognized as a pioneer in racial integration, a trailblazer in 
equal opportunity and race relations.  By 1954, one year before Rosa Parks refused to 
give up her seat on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama, a full decade before the Omnibus 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the last of the military’s all-black units was abolished.  
                                                 
7 Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 
1982), 11. 
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Although integration of the sexes would not occur for another twenty-plus years, and 
women would be barred from combat-related jobs for nearly twenty more years on top of 
that, the military has likewise been a national leader with respect to the employment of 
women.  For all of its well-publicized problems in gender relations, the US military 
actively works toward eliminating sexual harassment and discrimination, as the nation’s 
foremost employer of women in traditionally-male occupations and a place where women 
can rise to positions of authority in comparatively large numbers.  
It is strange, then, to find the armed forces several steps behind society in their 
treatment of gays. The US military, with its history of blazing a trail for equal 
opportunity, in a nation that so strongly professes to uphold and protect the rights and 
freedoms of its citizens, must surely seem out of touch as well to the rest of the world.  At 
last count, no fewer than 24 countries—including the closest allies of the US—allowed 
gays to serve openly in the military.8 One of the most interesting examples is Australia, 
which removed its ban on gays in the military during the period between President 
Clinton’s election to President in November 1992 and his inauguration in January 1993. 
Reportedly, Australia anticipated similar action by the US, given Clinton’s pledge to 
eliminate restrictions on the service of gays, and saw its move as in keeping with an 
international trend. 
There is yet another connection between blacks, women, and gays, although it is 
based purely on personal experience. In the early 1980s, when I was working on the 
Brookings Institution’s study of blacks and the military, I found that people were quite 
willing to grab my ear and share their views on the book’s topic. Obviously, my coauthor, 
Marty Binkin, and I knew that our work addressed a controversial and sensitive area, and 
we could easily understand that many of our friends, acquaintances, and co-workers 
would feel obliged to express an opinion or two.  We did not expect, however, that a 
number of people would seize the opportunity to tell us a racist joke, thinking that it was 
acceptable behavior or that we would appreciate the joke because of our research. 
Completely independently, we would even hear some of the same racist jokes from 
different people, perhaps stories that were making the rounds inside the Beltway or 
                                                 
8 Aaron Belkin, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Is the Gay Ban Based on Military Necessity?,” Parameters 
(Summer 2003): 109. 
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within sectors of the military establishment. We often wondered jointly in comparing 
notes, why did people simply assume that we would appreciate hearing these jokes? And, 
more importantly, why did they feel comfortable telling the jokes? 
I didn’t spend much time thinking about this phenomenon after the book was 
published, because it seemed to stop. The joke-tellers may have realized, after seeing the 
contents of the book, that the material was different than what they had expected. Then, a 
few years later, the phenomenon repeated—with a different target. I had become heavily 
involved studying the debate over assigning women to military combat; and when the 
subject of my research arose in conversation, particularly at social functions, I began to 
hear more and more sexist jokes. “Blonde jokes” were making the rounds, but it did not 
stop with that.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, I began using the military’s treatment of gays as 
a case in my graduate seminars on military manpower policy analysis. My students knew 
that I had studied the topic, because I would incorporate the Defense Department’s 
historical data on discharge rates in my background lectures and discussions. I would 
always strive to maintain complete objectivity and to conceal my personal opinions on 
the issue, whether in or outside of class. Yet, for some reason, most students probably 
assumed that I was strongly opposed to removing barriers on gays. Just as I tried to 
conceal my personal views, I am certain that I did nothing to promote this impression. In 
hindsight, I believe that it was merely taken for granted, largely because of my long-term 
employment with the Department of Defense, my professional affiliations, and my long 
association with various policy-level offices. In my students’ universe, where an 
extremely vocal majority supported barriers on gays, how could anyone feel otherwise?  
Simply put, there is a proper way of thinking about certain controversial issues; and, if 
one has achieved success within the defense establishment, she or he must be thinking 
properly.  Outliers do not last; they either remove themselves or they are rejected and cast 
out by the system. And so, I observed yet again that my academic interest in the subject 
of gays in the military led others to believe that they should share their opinions with me, 





My continuing interest in the military’s policy on gays eventually brought two 
Navy officers, Fred Cleveland and Mark Ohl, to my door in September of 1993.  
Cleveland, a graduate student in the NPS Financial Management curriculum, and Ohl, a 
graduate student in the field of Acquisitions and Supply, were interested in exploring 
whether Navy officers at NPS—supposedly representing the service’s best and brightest 
leaders of the future—actually understood the military’s brand new “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy.  The interest shown by these students was undoubtedly stimulated by their 
own difficulties in distinguishing between homosexual “conduct” and “orientation,” at 
least as defined by the policy, as well as by apparent misunderstandings over the new 
responsibilities of officers.  Ted Sarbin, a preeminent psychologist and coauthor of the 
most controversial PERSEREC report on gays, joined the study team as co-advisor, and 
we began the first in a series of three surveys at NPS.  As the Cleveland and Ohl study 
progressed, Ralph Carney, a social psychologist at PERSEREC, also joined the project as 
a third co-advisor.9 
 
 The First Survey, 199410 
 NPS offered an ideal environment for conducting a survey of Navy officers 
regarding “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” Officers at NPS are considered to be among the 
Navy’s finest, likely to remain in service and to rise in rank and influence. At the same 
time, the new policy, in removing any questions about homosexuality (“don’t ask”) from 
the military’s recruiting or application process, had shifted the responsibility for “gate 
keeping” from those at the point of entry to all members of the active-duty force, 
particularly those in positions of authority.  
 NPS was not only a good place to administer a small survey of attitudes toward 
gays, it was one of the only places. Two studies were commissioned by the Department 
of Defense during the period of the Great Debate: a major study organized by the RAND 
                                                 
9 Ralph Carney later co-organized a workshop on gays and the military for the 1994 national convention of 
APA in Los Angeles.  Papers from the workshop, along with other related articles, can be found in Gregory 
M. Herek, Jared B. Jobe, and Ralph M. Carney, eds., Out in Force: Sexual Orientation and the Military 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
10 The discussion of survey results draws heavily from Fred E. Cleveland and Mark A. Ohl, “‘Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell’: Policy Analysis and Interpretation” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1994). 
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Corporation, at a cost of about $1.3 million, and another, smaller inquiry by a team of 
Pentagon experts.11  But major studies take time, and the high-powered effort by RAND 
was not completed before a political deal began to take shape. Still, because of the 
controversy and delicate nature of the compromise, the Department of Defense wanted its 
two studies to be the last word on the matter, at least until the smoke cleared.  As a result, 
the Defense Department refused to allow any surveys of active-duty personnel regarding 
gays in the military.  A few researchers were clever enough to sidestep the embargo on 
surveys by interviewing personnel as they entered or departed from a military 
installation.  Other researchers, such as Cleveland and Ohl, wore the protective mantle of 
academic freedom; at NPS, they only needed to obtain the base commander’s approval, 
uphold the usual protections of privacy and confidentiality, and limit the survey to 
persons assigned to the command. 
 Cleveland and Ohl set out to identify potential problems that might hamper the 
effective implementation of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—including how Navy officers 
assessed their responsibilities and whether an officer’s ability to administer the policy 
might be influenced by personal experiences, biases, or possible difficulties in 
distinguishing between homosexual conduct and orientation. (Under the original 
provisions of the policy, “homosexual conduct” is grounds for discharge; sexual 
orientation, on the other hand, is considered “an abstract sexual preference” that is 
“distinct from a propensity or intent to engage in sexual acts” and thus deemed personal, 
private, and acceptable.12)  
 Cleveland and Ohl used a combination of focused interviews and a structured 
survey to gather data for the study.  The survey contained 43 items and was distributed to 
1,000 Navy officers attending NPS in February 1994.  A total of 605 completed surveys 
were returned.  Focused interviews were subsequently conducted with a diverse sample 
of Navy officers. 
                                                 
11 RAND produced a 518-page report that reflected the work of about 70 researchers. In contrast, the 
Defense Department experts submitted a 15-page, double-spaced memorandum. As a contributor to the 
RAND report observes, one of the studies was clearly “more influential” than the other.  See the comments 
of Robert MacCoun in Aaron Belkin and Geoffrey Bateman, eds., Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Debating the Gay 
Ban in the Military (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 77-80. 
12 Cleveland and Ohl, “Don’t Ask,” 26-30. 
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 One of the most interesting findings in the study by Cleveland and Ohl was the 
degree of ignorance displayed by officers regarding the policy.  For instance, over two-
thirds of the survey respondents claimed to know the difference between “conduct” and 
“orientation,” as defined by the policy; yet, when asked to distinguish between the two 
concepts in five typical scenarios, most respondents failed the test in four of the five 
examples.   
 Given the heated debate that preceded the new policy, and the many public 
statements from within the defense establishment against removing the gay ban, most 
officers were expected to express strongly negative views toward the presence of gays in 
the military.  In fact, 82 percent of survey respondents indicated that they “would prefer 
not to have homosexuals in [their] command.”  At the same time, an almost equal 
proportion (79 percent) of Navy officers felt that homosexuals “can cause the downfall of 
good order and discipline” in the Navy.  This sentiment was echoed in follow-up 
interviews.  A frequently heard sentiment was captured in the words on one officer:  “The 
military keeps out overweight and blind people, so it should also keep out homosexuals, 
who would not improve the level of defense.”  Opinions on gays seemed to soften 
somewhat when two controversial issues—gays in the military and women in combat—
surfaced in the interviews. A number of male Navy officers confessed that they would 
rather serve at sea with a homosexual man than with a straight woman.13 
 The Cleveland and Ohl study explored whether Navy officers in different warfare 
groups or demographic categories held noticeably different opinions of gays or the 
military’s policy.  The authors found differences of opinion based on age, officer 
community, gender, and race/ethnicity.  As anticipated from previous research and 
various national polls, younger officers appeared to have greater tolerance for gays than 
did their more senior counterparts; whites expressed greater acceptance of gays than did 
minorities; officers in “support” communities showed greater tolerance than did those in 
“warrior” fields; and female officers were considerably more tolerant of gays than were 
male officers.  Regarding differences by gender, for example, 86 percent of male officers 
preferred to not have homosexuals in their command; this compares with 60 percent 
                                                 
13 One cannot help but wonder where the blind and overweight fit in this hierarchy of undesirables.  The 
researchers never inquired. 
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female officers. In focused interviews, the researchers observed “a sort of kindred spirit” 
in the views of many women who felt that barriers based on sexuality are similar to those 
based on gender.  It is also noteworthy that three-quarters of all female respondents felt 
they were more tolerant than their “peers” on the issue of homosexuality in the military.  
About half of the male respondents claimed to feel the same way. 
 The so-called “contact hypothesis” was a subject of special interest in the study 
by Cleveland and Ohl, and it was an area that would be explored again in subsequent 
research.  Briefly, the “contact hypothesis” identifies certain types of contact between 
persons in majority and minority groups that may help to explain changes in attitudes 
toward minorities.14  In the present context, researchers attempted to determine if contact 
with homosexuals had any noticeable impact on estimated levels of tolerance or the 
greater acceptance of gays as “individuals” by Navy officers.15 
 To address the “contact hypothesis,” Cleveland and Ohl cross-tabulated responses 
to a question regarding personal contact (“I have a friend or relative who is homosexual”) 
with responses to various other questions on the survey.  Nearly half of all respondents 
claimed to have (or “possibly” have) a friend or relative who is homosexual.  When asked 
if they felt “uncomfortable in the presence of homosexuals and have difficulty interacting 
normally,” officers responded differently based on their level of contact: one-third of 
those who said they definitely (“yes”) had a homosexual friend or relative agreed to being 
uncomfortable; this compares with about half of those who “possibly” had a gay friend or 
relative and almost two-thirds of officers who claimed to have no homosexual friends or 
relatives. Additionally, Cleveland and Ohl found that officers interpreted the concept of 
“sexual misconduct” differently, according to their level of contact with homosexuals.  
This and other results led the researchers to conclude that contact between Navy officers 
with gays promoted generally increased tolerance by officers and more positive views 
toward allowing gays in military service. 
 
                                                 
14 See Gordon Allport, “The Effect of Contact,” in The Nature of Prejudice (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1954), 261-281. 
15 On this point, see Theodore R. Sarbin, “The Deconstruction of Stereotypes: Homosexuals and Military 
Policy,” in Herek, Jobe, and Carney, eds., Out in Force, 177-196. Additionally, Gregory Herek has 
examined the topic with respect to gays in a number of separate publications. 
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The Second Survey, 199616  
In April and May of 1996, Margaret Friery administered a survey at NPS with 
most of the same questions used by Cleveland Ohl two years earlier. Friery added seven 
questions to the survey and also conducted a series of seven focus group interviews. The 
interviews were held several months after the survey, in October and November. 
Friery distributed 800 surveys to Navy officers at NPS.  A total of 306 surveys 
were returned, for a response rate of 38 percent.  This is considerably below the rate 
obtained by Cleveland and Ohl (about 60 percent), likely reflecting diminished interest in 
the topic among officers.  Nevertheless, a number of officers exhibited remarkable 
enthusiasm:  almost one-third of all respondents took the time to submit written 
comments along with the survey. Further, despite the lower response rate, respondents 
were found to compare quite favorably with the total population of Navy officers at NPS 
based on gender, race/ethnicity, and years of military service. 
The results of the second survey indicated that a sizable proportion of Navy 
officers were still averse to serving with gays.  Almost 77 percent of officers in the 
second survey preferred “not to have homosexuals in my command.” This proportion is 
lower—by about 5 percentage points—than found on the previous survey.  It should also 
be noted that “preference” is a rather weak indicator of opinion, and it is better examined 
in terms of intensity. Of particular interest, then, is a relatively larger decline in the 
intensity of the officers’ “preferences” to not serve with gays—as the proportion of those 
expressing a “strong” preference against gays fell by 10 percentage points between 1994 
(56 percent) and 1996 (46 percent). 
In line with the results of the previous survey, Friery found that officers who had 
contact with a homosexual showed greater tolerance in their answers to survey questions. 
It is important to point out that the key indicator of personal contact, “I have a friend or 
relative who is homosexual,” was modified for the second survey by eliminating the 
response, “possibly,” and forcing officers to select either “yes” or “no.” Because of this 
change, proportionately more officers said “yes” on the second survey (46 percent) than 
on the first (29 percent); however, the proportion of officers saying either “yes” or 
                                                 
16 The discussion of survey results draws heavily from Margaret R. Friery, “Trends in Navy Officer 
Attitudes Toward the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 
1997) 
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“possibly” on the first survey (47 percent) was nearly the same as the proportion of 
officers indicating “yes” on the second survey. 
The responses to several question on the second survey provided further support 
for the “contact hypothesis.” Although the differences in opinion were not particularly 
large between those who knew a homosexual and those who did not, the trend was 
consistent.  For example, 69 percent of officers who claimed to know a homosexual were 
averse to serving with gays; this compares with 84 percent of officers who said they did 
not know a homosexual. Similarly, 64 percent of officers who knew a homosexual agreed 
with the statement that “gays can cause the downfall of good order and discipline”; 70 
percent of officers who did not know a homosexual agreed with this statement. Further, 
33 percent of officers who knew a homosexual—compared with 54 percent of those who 
did not—claimed to feel comfortable interacting normally with gays. When officers were 
asked to rate themselves on their own tolerance toward gays, 71 percent of those who 
knew a homosexual claimed to be more tolerant than their peers; among those who did 
not know a homosexual, 57 percent felt they were more tolerant. 
On the matter of tolerance, 15 percent of all respondents thought that they had 
actually become more tolerant since the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was enacted, and 
another 55 percent said that “the Navy’s attitude” had moved toward greater tolerance of 
gays since the policy was established.  Additionally, over half of the Navy officers felt 
that gays would eventually be allowed to serve openly in the military. 
The combination of survey questions and focus group interviews led Friery to 
conclude that Navy officers were even more confused and uncertain in 1996 than in 1994 
about the basic elements of the policy and an officer’s role in enforcing it. A number of 
officers, in fact, disagreed with the policy’s fundamental premise that “homosexuality is 
incompatible with military service.”  Perhaps these were the same officers who freely 
admitted in the interviews that they exercised discretionary judgment in applying or 
ignoring the policy.  According to Friery: “If the homosexual [known to the officer] is a 
good performer and does not cause problems in the unit, the officer will probably turn a 
blind eye to the person’s homosexuality.  Conversely, if the service member is not a good 
performer or could use their homosexuality to disrupt the unit, officers say they will 
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interpret the policy in a way that will facilitate removing the ‘problem sailor.’”17 Or, in 
the words of one Navy officer: “These guys are a resource. And as long as they don’t 
manifest their sexual orientation by actions or vocalizing this orientation, then the cost 
associated with their orientation is nonexistent.  As soon as they manifest their behavior, 
then you’ve introduced a whole new set of baggage to their contribution.”18  
 
The Third Survey, 199919 
John Bicknell administered the third and most recent survey of Navy officers at 
NPS in October 1999.  Bicknell sought to determine if the attitudes of Navy officers 
toward gays in the military had changed since “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was introduced, 
relying heavily on the results of the two previous studies.  Bicknell’s research design was 
modeled after that employed in the earlier efforts, utilizing similar methods of data 
collection, most of the same survey questions, and a similar target population. The 
questionnaire used by Friery was modified only slightly by eliminating one question and 
adding another. Bicknell opted to forego interviews, but expanded the survey to include 
Marine Corps officers at NPS as well as enlisted personnel from the Navy and Marine 
Corps at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California.  
Survey forms were distributed to 626 Navy officers and 185 Marine Corps 
officers enrolled at NPS.  Navy officers returned 216 completed surveys, and Marine 
Corps officers returned 74 surveys.  This amounts to a return rate of approximately 35 
percent for Navy officers and 40 percent for the Marines.  In November 1999, a total of 
363 survey forms were distributed to Navy enlisted personnel at DLI, and another 250 
were distributed to enlisted Marines.  Response rates for enlisted personnel were 
considerably lower than for officers: just 23 sailors (6 percent) and 59 Marines (24 
percent) returned completed surveys. Remarkably, written comments were submitted by 
74 officers (26 percent of officer respondents) and 19 enlisted personnel (23 percent of 
enlisted respondents).  
                                                 
17 Friery, “Trends,” 67. 
18 Ibid., 111. 
19 The discussion of survey results draws heavily from John W. Bicknell, Jr., “Study of Naval Officers’ 
Attitudes Toward Homosexuals in the Military” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2000). 
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Officers who responded to the survey were a reasonably close match to the base 
population of officers at NPS in terms of gender, race/ethnicity, years of service, rank, 
and education level.  The representativeness of officers by occupational community could 
not be adequately determined.  Although the sample of enlisted respondents was also 
similar to the enlisted population at DLI, based on several demographic measures, the 
sample was considered too small for meaningful statistical analysis. 
Bicknell’s study, despite lacking an interview component, was the most 
comprehensive of the three summarized here, as he attempted to apply a range of 
statistical techniques in analyzing the survey results, comparing the attitudes of Navy 
officers with those of Marine officers, and identifying trends across the three surveys. 
This brief review can only touch upon his major findings. 
As in the previous two surveys, the vast majority of Navy officers (67 percent) 
“would prefer not to have homosexuals” in their command, and an even higher 
proportion of Marine Corps officers (88 percent) felt the same way.  The proportion of 
Navy officers who were averse to serving with gays, however, fell with each 
administration of the survey (15 percentage points lower in 1999 than in1994 and 10 
percentage points lower than in 1996).  Even more noteworthy is the fact that the 
intensity of this feeling declined successively: from 56 percent agreeing “strongly” in the 
first survey, to 46 percent in the second, to 37 in the third. 
This apparent “softening” of views toward gays in the military was observed in 
survey questions across the board over time; just as Friery found evidence of greater 
tolerance toward gays in 1996 than in 1994, Bicknell found continuing movement in this 
direction from the second survey to the third.  For example, on one of the key 
questions—“feeling uncomfortable” with gays and having “difficulty interacting 
normally” with them—the proportions of Navy officers agreeing declined from 58 
percent in 1994 to 44 percent in 1996 to 37 percent in 1999.  At the same time, 56 percent 
of Navy officers agreed that “a division officer’s sexual preference has no effect on the 
officer’s ability to lead”—a view shared by 53 percent of officers in 1996 and 38 percent 
in 1994.  Noteworthy, too, was the finding that 20 percent of respondents “strongly 
agreed” with this statement in 1999, compared with just 12 percent in the first survey.  
Even the respondents themselves claimed to have greater tolerance: in 1999, 71 percent 
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of Navy officers felt they were more tolerant than their peers regarding gays in the 
military; recall that 64 percent made the same claim in 1996 and 56 percent in 1994. 
In the two previous surveys, the results clearly demonstrated that Navy officers 
had a poor grasp of the military’s policy and their new responsibilities as “gate keepers.” 
By the time of the third survey, some seven years since “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was 
introduced, Navy officers expressed greater confidence in themselves as a group: more 
than four out of five officers felt that they could distinguish the difference between 
homosexual conduct and sexual orientation.  On questions designed to test the knowledge 
of respondents, officers in 1999 also exhibited proportionately greater agreement 
regarding the answers.  A major problem here, however, was that these officers 
sometimes coalesced on the wrong answer.  For instance, over 80 percent felt that lawful 
off-duty sexual activity was of no concern to them as Navy officers; almost 70 percent 
would not investigate a report of hand-holding by two service members of the same sex 
in a movie theater; and 74 percent did not feel that marching in a “gay parade” 
demonstrated homosexual orientation.  In fact, according to the policy: no distinction 
should be made in how a service member conducts herself or himself on-duty or off-duty; 
a report of same-sex hand-holding should be investigated; and marching in a “gay 
parade” demonstrates sexual orientation (but should not be construed as homosexual 
misconduct). 
In reviewing the findings of the 1994 study, researchers concluded that some 
errors in interpreting the policy were the result of officers merely attempting to apply 
common sense.  The officers assumed that the policy was intended to ease restrictions on 
the service of gays.  In the second study, a number of officers were surprised to learn that 
their definition of homosexual misconduct was different than the definition required by 
the policy. So, one must ask: were the officers in 1999 truly more ignorant of the policy 
than those who came before; were they assuming too much of the policy, say, that it 
promoted greater leniency toward the treatment of gays; or were they actually indicating 
how they would act in a given situation, based on a common-sense approach?  
Bicknell concluded that officers in 1999 were generally more tolerant of gays, in 
many ways, and less inclined to initiate action under the policy: “Policy semantics aside, 
[the results] show that Navy officers’ opinions about conduct and orientation have 
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changed over the 1994-1999 period, and that respondents are less likely to pursue reports 
involving gay activity—whatever that activity may be.”20 
 Although still in the minority, 44 percent of Navy officers in 1999 claimed to 
“like the current policy better than the old policy.”  This compares with 30 percent in 
1996 and 23 percent in 1994.  An unusual finding here is that appreciation for the current 
policy has apparently risen along with increased misunderstanding of the policy’s key 
elements and greater confidence by the very same officers in being able to apply the 
policy correctly.  So, officers like the policy better but understand it less—and they are 
more convinced than ever that they can fulfill their responsibilities under the policy. This 
odd set of trends could suggest that Navy officers are becoming more tolerant of gays in 
the military—the “softening” of attitudes mentioned above—and projecting their views 
onto the policy. This could also help to explain why almost 60 percent of Navy officers in 
the third survey felt it was “just a matter of time” before gays are allowed to serve openly 
in the military—up from 56 percent in 1996 and about 50 percent in 1994. 
A continuing theme in the three studies revolves around the notion that wider 
contact with gays leads to greater tolerance of their presence in the military.  Previously, 
this theme was investigated using a single question as the basis for determining contact—
that is, whether the individual had a friend or relative who was homosexual.  In the 1999 
version of the survey, a question was added to further explore the “contact hypothesis”:  
“I personally know a homosexual service member.”  In addition, respondents were given 
the opportunity to once again express their uncertainty in answering either question 
regarding personal knowledge of a homosexual.  (Recall that Friery limited responses to 
either “yes” or “no.”) 
The results of the third survey, including the option of indicating uncertainty, 
suggest that the proportion of Navy officers who claim to have a gay friend or relative 
has increased: in 1999, 36 percent of the respondents answered “no,” compared with over 
half of the respondents in each of the previous two surveys. Even more noteworthy are 
the results to the new question: over 21 percent of Navy officers were certain that they 
knew a homosexual service member, and another 26 percent were not sure enough to say 
“yes” or “no.”  Taken another way, at least one in five Navy officers claimed to know 
                                                 
20 Bicknell, “Study,”67. 
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someone in the military who was definitely gay. Now, how would these officers actually 
know that a person was homosexual if they had not been “told” or seen evidence of 
homosexuality from near or afar? Are these officers unaware of their responsibilities 
under the policy, or do they just choose to ignore the matter? (Another explanation is that 
some of the respondents are gay, and they may know others who are gay through 
confidential networks.)  In the sample of Marine Corps officers, discussed more fully 
below, only 4 percent claimed to know a homosexual service member; about 84 percent 
of Marine officers were certain that they did not know a homosexual in the military. 
Similar to the findings of the previous two surveys, Bicknell found that Navy 
officers who had a gay friend or relative expressed considerably stronger acceptance of 
gays in the military.  For instance, 20 percent of officers with a gay friend or relative 
indicated that they felt “uncomfortable” or had “difficulty interacting” with gays; the 
proportion was three times as large among those without a gay friend or relative.  Forty 
percent of officers with a gay friend or relative agreed that “allowing gays in the Navy 
will erode good order and discipline”; this compares with about 80 percent of officers 
without a gay friend or relative.  Overall, levels of acceptance of gays appeared higher in 
1999 than in 1996.  Interestingly, the opposite trend was found for Navy officers who did 
not know a homosexual—in a sort of “reverse contact hypothesis”—as their levels of 
acceptance or “tolerance” actually declined in 1999 from that of the previous survey. 
Bicknell also discovered that increased contact generally raised levels of 
acceptance: Navy officers who had a gay friend or relative and claimed to know a gay 
service member were seemingly more tolerant than were those who reported just one or 
the other form of contact. Curiously, officers who reported knowing a gay service 
member, but not having a gay friend or relative, were less tolerant in their survey 
responses than were those who reported having no gay contacts at all. This may be 
attributed to the small sample size of officers in the category, or to the understanding that 
the person known to be homosexual by these officers was neither a friend nor a relative.  
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According to Allport, casual forms of contact may actually intensify prejudice toward a 
minority group.21 
As for officers with both forms of contact—friends or relatives as well as a gay 
service member—nearly 80 percent agreed that “homosexuals should not be restricted 
from serving in the Navy.” This compares with about 50 percent of the officers who 
reported having a gay friend or relative, 24 percent of of those with no contact, and 14 
percent of officers who said they only knew a homosexual service member. 
More intensive statistical analysis of the “contact hypothesis” (an approach using 
principal components and exploratory factor analysis, model formulation, and ordinary 
least squares [OLS] regression analysis) suggested that the combination of having a gay 
friend or relative and knowing a gay service member was the key influence in changing 
the attitudes of Navy officers toward greater tolerance.22  As Bicknell writes: “The 
significant BOTH variable [combination of forms of contact] parameter estimates ranged 
in magnitude from –0.68 to –0.97, which means that persons who have contact with a 
homosexual are much more likely to be tolerant of gays in the military, comfortable in 
the presence of homosexuals, and less likely to think that the presence of gays in a unit 
will [adversely] affect readiness.”23 
Bicknell also attempted to identify differences in attitudes by demographic group 
and by military service, since the 1999 survey was the first of the three to include a non-
Navy sample. As expected from previous research on attitudes toward gays, survey 
results varied by gender and age: Navy women were more tolerant than Navy men, and 
junior officers were more tolerant than senior officers in both the Navy and the Marine 
Corps. In addition, Navy officers were generally more tolerant that officers in the Marine 
Corps. Comparing results across the three surveys, the responses of Marine Corps 
                                                 
21 Just 14 Navy officers were in this category.  A total of 31 officers had contact with a friend or relative 
and knew a gay service member; and 68 officers reported having only a gay friend or relative.  Allport 
addresses “casual” forms of contact in “The Effect of Contact,” 263-264.  (See Bicknell, “Study,” 84-85.) 
22 See Bicknell, “Study,” 101-132 for a complete description of the methodology and results.  Measures of 
comparative tolerance are based on a principal component called Condemnation-Tolerance.  
23 Ibid., 128. As Bicknell points out, however, in citing the work of Gregory Herek and Eric Glunt 
(“Interpersonal Contact and Heterosexual’s Attitudes Toward Gay Men: Results From a National Survey,” 
Journal of Sex Research 30 (August 1993), 239-44), contact with homosexuals does not necessarily cause 
heterosexuals to have a more favorable attitude toward gays.  Indeed, people who have a more favorable 
attitude toward gays from the outset are more likely to have contact with gays and develop a relationship 
that is not superficial. 
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officers in 1999 often appeared similar to the responses of Navy officers in 1994; and, in 
certain areas, such as readiness and leadership, Marine officers appeared less tolerant 
than did Navy officers in 1994.  For example, on the question of whether “homosexuals 
and heterosexuals should have equal rights,” 47 percent of Marine Corps officers said 
they should not; this compares with 30 percent of Navy officers in 1999, 33 percent in 
1996, and 47 percent in 1994.  Thirty-two percent of Navy officers in 1999 agreed that 
they did “not want a gay person as a neighbor”; this is lower than in 1996 (39 percent) 
and in 1994 (55 percent), and half the proportion of Marine Corps officers (64 percent) 
agreeing with the same statement in 1999. 
“Aside from the differences between the two Naval services,” Bicknell observes, 
“Gender was the largest tangible demographic variable found to be linked with levels of 
tolerance.”24  Navy women emerged as the “single most tolerant group” from the data 
analysis.  For example, 75 percent of female Navy officers claimed to have “no difficulty 
working for a gay commanding officer,” compared with 37 percent of their male 
counterparts who felt the same way. About 75 percent of female Navy officers—and 33 
percent of male Navy officers—felt that “homosexuals should not be restricted from 
serving in the Navy.” Nine out of ten female Navy officers agreed that “sexual preference 
has no effect on leadership ability” and that they (the survey respondent) would have “no 
difficulty obeying an order from the Commanding Officer to work with a homosexual” 
on a difficult or dangerous assignment.  
 
Concluding Observations 
 One particular trend in the 1999 survey may be most useful in speculating about 
the future.  As mentioned above, younger officers were generally more tolerant of 
homosexuals than were their senior counterparts. Increasing seniority implies that the 
officer has been “homogenized” to some extent by the organization.  Simply put, officers 
who best resemble those in power, those who rate personnel performance and grant 
promotion, are most likely to be promoted into the higher echelons of the organization.  
At the same time, officers who are not promoted according to a set schedule must leave 
(“up or out”); and officers who recognize that their values, principles, attitudes, or beliefs 
                                                 
24 Bicknell, “Study,” 137. 
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differ markedly from those of the organization or most of its members may decide to 
leave voluntarily (that is, “select themselves out”).  In the past, this cycle of conformity—
resulting from self-selection and the organization’s reward system—has operated to 
perpetuate a predominately negative view toward gays in the military, and one that 
apparently remains quite strong in the Marine Corps. 
 The results of the three surveys of Navy officers, however, suggest that change is 
afoot. As a majority of Navy officers indicated in 1996 and in1999, “it is just a matter of 
time” before the military’s restrictions on gays are completely removed. Increasing levels 
of tolerance toward gays are found among more officers who have passed through the 
early hurdles of career advancement and appear headed toward leadership roles in the 
Navy.  For whatever reason—the “contact hypothesis,” changing views in American 
society, demographic influences—the cycle of conformity is gradually shifting toward 
greater tolerance of gays in the Navy and, perhaps, in the larger military. 
 The inevitability of allowing acknowledged homosexuals to serve in the military 
was an important point of agreement among most scholars who participated in a 
conference on the military’s policy held in December 2000.  “Most of us presume that 
lifting the ban is inevitable,” observed one participant.25  “Perhaps the military ought to 
use more constructively the time that ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ provides and try to prepare 
for the inevitable inclusion of gays and lesbians,” another scholar and retired Navy 
captain commented, “for I do think it is inevitable.”26  And the director of a legal and 
political advocacy group for gays stated: “We do see it as inevitable that the policy will 
be overturned, but we think it will be within five to ten years, not within the next 
administration.”27 
 Gays in the military, as our spacemen discovered, dominated all television news 
about the peacetime military in the entire previous decade, and it is not likely to just 
disappear quickly or gently. Whenever I contemplate the inevitability of lifting the ban—
and it surely is inevitable—I try to remind myself of a discussion held in a graduate 
seminar on policy analysis a few years ago.  The students, all military officers, had just 
finished reading Ted Sarbin’s excellent paper on “The Deconstruction of Stereotypes,” 
                                                 
25 Belkin and Bateman, eds., “Don’t Ask,” 169. 
26 Ibid., 59-60. 
27 Ibid., 173. 
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originally presented at an APA symposium on “Integrating Lesbians and Gay Men into 
the Military.”  In his paper, Sarbin identifies four discrete constructions of homosexuality 
in American history: “homosexuality as sin, as crime, as sickness, and, most recently, as 
the defining feature of a minority group.”28  It was my intent in class to work our way 
through these four social constructions.  As it turned out, after nearly two hours of 
spirited, often heated discussion, I realized that we had essentially failed to progress 
beyond a single construction, sin. 






                                                 
28 Sarbin, “Deconstruction,” 179. Emphasis added. 
